grasp of the evolutionary patterns of H5N1 HPAIVs can help to estimate the speed of emergence of avian influenza in human cases.
In addition to the direct transmission of avian influenza to humans, it is possible that the avian influenza genes incorporate and mix with the influenza genes from other species, such as swine and human, resulting in genetic recombination. We had already experienced the emergence of reassortant novel H1N1 influenza in 2009. 7 Although the initial 2009 wave of influenza in Taiwan was mild, 8 transmission was not completely blocked by routine infectious disease control procedures, and some atypical presentations could occur in the future. 9, 10 Because there are not presently any reported human cases of H5N2, the likely biological behavior of this HPAI in humans is unclear and subject to speculation. Based on the existence of multiple basic amino acids in hemagglutinin, it is very likely that the H5N2 virus will act more like the H5N1 virus. This is notwithstanding the fact that the H5N2 virus will probably require some time to evolve, so an imminent outbreak in humans is only a remote possibility.
Nevertheless, several important steps should be initiated, including the monitoring of personnel, animals on farms, and migratory birds. In addition, an effective preparedness plan is crucial, which should include an ongoing search for an effective vaccine and the stockpiling of antiviral drugs and personal protective devices. With accurate information and ample preparedness, the status quo should be vigilance, not panic.
